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DAY ZERO

Source → output

Current 3

Everything that currently survives evidence review — presented in the order the system surfaced it. This is not a global ranking: no case has a score, and the numbering carries no meaning beyond page order.

The unit here is INTRO_READY_AWU — one builder or team lead that survives evidence review and is genuinely worth spending relationship capital on. The current count is 3. No introduction has been made and nobody named below has been contacted. One lead (multikernel/sandlock) is carried as WATCH with an explicit analyst override rather than INTRO_READY, because the company is further along than the Day-0 model assumes — the flag is preserved, not hidden.

01

WATCH · analyst overrideBUILDING · github + research + web

multikernel/sandlock

multikernel/sandlock — process-based AI agent sandbox for Linux, no container

Builder / team
Cong Wang and the Multikernel Technologies team (8 human contributors on sandlock)
Actual artifact
github.com/multikernel/sandlock (Rust, Apache-2.0) + arXiv:2605.26298
Why it surfaced — and why company-first sourcing misses it
358 stars on the sandbox repo; the founder has 72 GitHub followers, no blog field and no X-native presence; the strongest corroborating evidence sits on LKML and arXiv. No institutional financing was identified in the public sources reviewed, so no funding database would surface it.
Why now
807 owner commits, pushed the day of review; sandlock.io registered 2026-08-08; an arXiv paper published 2026-05-25; and a company products page that now lists "Multikernel Sandbox (AI agent sandboxing runtime)" as a commercial product.
Formation evidence
GitHub org Multikernel Technologies, Inc. created 2025-03-08 (F-02, F-06); multikernel.io and sandlock.io (F-01); commercial product page and demo booking (F-07). No public financing round was found in the sources reviewed.
Technical-depth evidence
Kernel-level isolation using unprivileged Linux primitives, from a maintainer of the Linux networking traffic-control subsystem. Systems depth OBSERVED; technical difficulty remains UNKNOWN until the escape surface is tested.
Strongest positive
Four independent channels spanning 17 months (org registry, company domain, LKML, arXiv), plus a paper co-authored with the AgentSight author — a cross-link between two independently-surfaced Phase 1 leads.
Strongest negative
The company is already selling. This is closer to the late edge of Day 0 than Phase 1 assumed, and a round may exist that is simply not public.
Array relevance
Agent execution isolation. Array's own AI coworker runs "in its own filesystem sandbox with isolated execution", and the April 2026 security post argues agents move data through syscalls where existing tooling cannot see them.
What must be verified before an introduction
Whether a priced round has closed; team size; whether sandlock is the commercial focus or a research artifact beside the cloud-OS product.

The technical question

Sandlock claims confinement using unprivileged Linux primitives. What is the actual escape surface compared with a microVM boundary, and what does the paper's threat model deliberately exclude?

The commercial / formation question

Multikernel now sells three products (Private Cloud, Sandbox, LiveUpdate). Is the agent sandbox a wedge into the cloud-OS business, or the business itself? Those imply different buyers and different funding paths.

signals B-01 · B-02 · B-03 · B-08 · B-09 · C-03 · D-01 · D-05 · F-01 · F-02 · F-06 · V-02 · V-03

02

INTRO READYFORMING · github + web

sipyourdrink-ltd/bernstein

bernstein — deterministic orchestrator for CLI coding agents

Builder / team
Alex Chernysh (solo; Sip Your Drink Ltd)
Actual artifact
github.com/sipyourdrink-ltd/bernstein (Python, Apache-2.0)
Why it surfaced — and why company-first sourcing misses it
960 stars against 3,669 commits. A one-person studio with no press, no accelerator and no financing identified in the public sources reviewed.
Why now
3,669 commits since 2026-03-22, pushed the day of review; bernstein.run live; a registered UK company (F-06) created eight days after the repo.
Formation evidence
F-01 bernstein.run; F-02 org 2026-03-28; F-06 'Ltd' in the registered org name.
Technical-depth evidence
Removing the model from the coordination loop is an architectural stance, not a wrapper: it converts an LLM-orchestration problem into a scheduling problem. Depth markers OBSERVED across D-02/D-04/D-05/D-06; difficulty UNKNOWN until read.
Strongest positive
The highest construction-to-attention ratio in the eligible set, with a registered company behind it.
Strongest negative
Studio of one. No co-founder, no external contributor above 37 commits, and deterministic orchestration is a crowded idea even if this implementation is not.
Array relevance
Objective verification and failure recovery — the two LoopOps components Shruti's July 2026 post names as missing (completion gates, escalation queues).
What must be verified before an introduction
Whether anyone runs Bernstein in production; whether the determinism claim holds under tool failure; whether the founder intends a company or a tool.

The technical question

"No model in the coordination loop" is the whole claim. Where exactly does determinism break — tool output ordering, retries, or agent nondeterminism — and what does the orchestrator do when a sub-agent returns something unparseable?

The commercial / formation question

A one-person studio with 3,669 commits and a registered company. Is Bernstein the product, or infrastructure for a product? And who is the first buyer — platform teams, or individual engineers?

signals B-01 · B-02 · B-03 · D-02 · D-04 · D-05 · D-06 · F-01 · F-02 · F-06 · V-02 · V-03

03

INTRO READYFORMING · github + web

scanaislop/aislop

aislop — code-quality and security gate for AI-authored code

Builder / team
Kenny Olawuwo (software/security engineer) + 5 contributors
Actual artifact
github.com/scanaislop/aislop (TypeScript, MIT)
Why it surfaced — and why company-first sourcing misses it
572 stars. No financing identified in the public sources reviewed, and the category is described in Array's own writing as unfilled.
Why now
319 owner commits since 2026-03-06, pushed 2026-08-22; org created 2026-04-19; scanaislop.com live.
Formation evidence
F-01 scanaislop.com; F-02 org created 2026-04-19.
Technical-depth evidence
Security and compiler-adjacent markers OBSERVED (D-02, D-05, D-06). Difficulty UNKNOWN: the honest question is whether this is real analysis or rule packaging.
Strongest positive
Sits on a category Array has publicly stated it wants and cannot find.
Strongest negative
Lowest technical-depth confidence of the three. A code-quality gate is the easiest thing on this list for an incumbent linter vendor to absorb.
Array relevance
"Vibe coding security" — securing production code written by agents — is one of the four categories Array's April 2026 security post says it is ACTIVELY SEEKING.
What must be verified before an introduction
Whether the detection is agent-specific or generic; whether any team has it in a CI gate; who the second engineer is.

The technical question

Detecting "dead code, unsafe casts, swallowed errors" is classic static analysis. What is genuinely different about agent-authored code that a tuned existing linter would miss, and is that difference measurable?

The commercial / formation question

Is the buyer the platform team that owns the CI gate, or the security team that owns the risk? The pricing and the wedge differ.

signals B-01 · B-02 · B-03 · D-02 · D-05 · D-06 · F-01 · F-02 · V-02

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